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INTRODUCTIONL EGAL journals and commentary are replete with discussions of
aditional conflicts of interest, i.e., the representation of a client
by an attorney or law firm when that attorney or firm also represents
or has represented a second client whose interests are materially or
directly adverse to those of the first client. Despite a pervasive-some
might even say obsessive-focus on the ethical prohibition against
representation of opposing parties, there has been little or no discus-
sion of a certain aspect of the conflicts problem: the treatment of po-
sitional conflicts. Positional conflicts-sometimes known as business
conflicts-may occur when a lawyer or law firm's presentation of a
legal argument on behalf of one client is directly contrary to, or has a
detrimental impact on, the position advanced on behalf of a second
client in a different case or matter. Few law review articles have been
written on the subject. It receives scant attention in the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Model Rules"), and the few ethi-
cal decisions issued on the topic are brief and, for the most part, unil-
luminating. There are virtually no reported decisions disqualifying an
attorney or law firm on the basis of positional conflicts. Most major
law firms, having established detailed policies and procedures to iden-
tify traditional conflicts, have no written policy and no formal proce-
dure for defining or dealing with positional conflicts.1
Despite the neglect of this issue in the legal literature and in prac-
tice, the definition and treatment of positional conflicts is a vitally im-
portant concern in one context: the availability of pro bono resources
to handle major litigation, transactional, and policy matters. Public
interest legal groups-including civil rights and women's rights orga-
nizations, the ACLU, environmental groups, and others-have tradi-
tionally relied upon the pro bono assistance of lawyers, particularly
those in major law firms, to represent or act as co-counsel with the
*Copyright © 1998, The Pro Bono Institute.
** Esther F. Lardent is the President of the Pro Bono Institute, a non-profit or-
ganization located at the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington. D.C.,
which undertakes research, policy, and technical assistance focused on enhancing ac-
cess to justice for low and moderate income persons. Ms. Lardent has written and
lectured widely on ethical issues in the legal services and pro bono context. The au-
thor gratefully acknowledges the research assistance provided for this article by Dan
Catalanello.
1. See Norman W. Spaulding, Note, The Prophet and rte Bureaucrat: Positional
Conflicts in Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1395, 1414 (1998).
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organization for the complex litigation matters on their docket. In
addition, since 1996, when Congress first adopted legislation that im-
posed severe restrictions on the legal work of any program receiving
funding through the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC"),2 the de-
mand for pro bono assistance in major matters has increased dramati-
cally. Among other restrictions, LSC-funded programs are prohibited
from participating in class action suits, challenging welfare laws and
regulations, or lobbying legislative bodies (except in narrowly defined
circumstances) .3
These restrictions were put in place during the same congressional
term that saw the passage of major legislation that profoundly altered
the rights and benefits afforded to disabled children, poor families,
immigrants and asylum seekers, prisoners, and many others.4
Whether one agrees with those substantive changes or not, anyone
who supports an equitable justice system will agree that those affected
by the new legislation should have the opportunity to test, clarify,
shape, and challenge these laws. The analogous situation in the com-
mercial context would be to pass a major telecommunications bill,
while at the same time prohibiting phone companies, cable providers,
computer firms, and others from consulting and using law firms to ad-
dress the issues raised by that bill. Because legal challenges to the
LSC restrictions have, to date, been essentially unsuccessful, the need
for expanded private sector resources to undertake restricted activi-
ties is clear. In light of the fact that much of this work involves prece-
dent-setting cases and aggressive policy advocacy, an unexamined,
overly broad concern about positional conflicts will sharply reduce the
resources available to handle restricted activities. Without clarity and
attention to this issue, concerns about alienating paying corporate cli-
ents-even those not grounded in law, ethics, or reality-will inevita-
bly trump the lawyer's obligation to undertake pro bono work,
particularly in complex and controversial matters.
To address this problem, this Article examines and critiques the ex-
isting ethical rules and opinions that address positional conflicts and
examines current law firm practices in identifying and dealing with
potential conflicts. It then proposes a revised approach to positional
conflicts as well as practical approaches that law firms can use to
strike an appropriate balance between their obligations to the public
and the justice system and their ethical obligations and economic in-
terests with respect to paying clients.
2. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53.
3. See Alan W. Houseman, Major Law Firms: Responding to Devolution and the
Legal Services Crisis, What's New L. Firm Pro Bono (Law Firm Pro Bono Project,
Wash., D.C.), Mar./Apr. 1998, at 4, 4.
4. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
7, 8, 21, 25, 42 U.S.C.).
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I. A CLOSER LOOK AT POSITIONAL CONFLICTS
What kinds of situations may raise the specter of impermissible po-
sitional conflicts between a commercial client and a pro bono client?
The hypothetical situations described below offer a range (though
hardly the entire spectrum) of situations that might be construed as
potential positional conflicts. The use of hypotheticals is designed to
assist the reader in understanding the nature of positional conflicts
and the types of pro bono matters that a firm may decline on the basis
of positional conflict. The issues raised by these hypothetical situa-
tions are addressed at a later point in this Article using the author's
proposed frame of reference and procedures.
1. Luban, Menkel & Meadow, a 200-attorney law firm in Washing-
ton, D.C., has a traditional corporate practice. Although its labor and
employment department is not as large as its litigation or corporate
departments, the firm does represent corporate clients in employment
litigation cases and, using its lobbyists, has, on behalf of those clients,
sought changes in the law that limited the ability of discharged em-
ployees to sue their former employers. A major civil rights legal or-
ganization has asked the firm to serve as pro bono counsel in an action
brought to secure a ruling that a recent bill, strengthening the process
for bringing discrimination employment suits, should be enforced ret-
roactively. The head of the firm's labor department vehemently op-
poses taking on the matter, arguing that because the firm, on behalf of
one of its clients, lobbied unsuccessfully to insert an explicit provision
into this legislation that enforcement be prospective only, represent-
ing the other side of the issue would present an impermissible posi-
tional conflict for the firm. Is this position accurate?
2. The same firm has been contacted by the D.C. Federal District
Court, through the court's pro bono program, to represent an individ-
ual pro se litigant, an African-American woman who has filed a Title
VII race discrimination case in the court. Her employer is not a client
of the firm. The labor department head, once again, has opposed tak-
ing on the case. He argues that a firm that represents large, corporate
employers simply cannot ethically advocate the interests of an em-
ployee. Does this situation pose an impermissible positional conflict?
3. Rhode & Galanter, a large law firm in San Francisco wvith a na-
tional practice, has been asked by the Sierra Club to file an appeal
with state and federal environmental agencies to block the construc-
tion of a dam in Maine that will flood and destroy a unique eco-envi-
ronment mn the northeastern part of that state. Although the firm has
not handled any wetlands or water rights cases for its corporate cli-
ents, it does have a small environmental practice and has hopes bf
expanding its environmental work. Currently, the firm represents a
number of corporations in matters involving emissions standards and
Superfund clean-ups. May the firm ethically represent the Sierra
Club? Could it decline that representation on ethical grounds?
1999] 2281
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4. San Francisco's Rhode & Galanter also has a major transactional
practice. As part of the firm's commitment to pro bono service, it is
actively seeking to involve its non-litigators in pro bono work. One of
the first transactional pro bono projects undertaken by the firm is
serving as general counsel to a community development organization
in a low-income neighborhood seeking to strengthen its community by
bringing in locally-based businesses and creating job opportunities.
Several months after Rhode agreed to represent the organization, the
group asks the Rhode & Galanter team to help negotiate an agree-
ment with a major supermarket chain that is opening the neighbor-
hood's first large market. The community organization's leadership
wants the agreement to include a commitment that at least half of the
construction crew and supermarket hires will come from the local
community and that a portion of the land to be purchased will be set
aside for a children's playground, with the costs of construction to be
borne by the company. After meeting with the community group, one
of the business lawyers reminded her colleagues that the firm, in nego-
tiating to site a plant on behalf of another client, a manufacturing
company in another city, had advocated successfully that similar "tie-
in" agreements were unwise. Having opposed tie-in provisions previ-
ously, can the firm ethically advocate for such provisions for its cur-
rent pro bono client?
5. Houseman & Green, a large firm in Minneapolis with branch
offices in several cities, including Washington, D.C., is known as a
high-powered lobbying firm. The Welfare Law Center, fearing that
the move in several states to privatize processing of claims for finan-
cial assistance under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) program will result in a higher denial rate for applicants, has
asked the firm to assist the Center on a pro bono basis in lobbying for
federal legislation mandating greater oversight by state agencies of
private companies that process claims for benefits. The legislation
would include penalties if those private companies act in a "lawless"
manner in arbitrarily denying claims, to be paid into a fund to cover
child-care costs for recipients. Like many D.C. law firms, Houseman
& Green's Washington office has a busy government contracts prac-
tice, representing manufacturers that provide equipment and materi-
als to federal agencies, particularly the military. On occasion, the
firm's lobbying group has been involved with that practice, seeking to
soften provisions in federal government contracts that mandate pay-
ment of penalties by manufacturers for cost overruns, delays, or
equipment failure. The same lobbyists would undoubtedly be working
on the legislation identified by the Welfare Law Center. Should the
firm take on this new pro bono assignment?
[Vol. 672282
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II. EXISTING ETHICS PROVISIONS, OPINIONS, AND ANALYSES OF
POSITIONAL CONFLICTS
Unfortunately, the ethical standards currently available to analyze
potential positional conflicts are quite limited and unhelpful. The
Model Rules and existing ethics opinions offer little useful guidance.
The two Model Rules provisions that explicitly address potential con-
flicts of interest in the public interest context, Rules 6.3 (Membership
in Legal Services Organization) and 6.4 (Law Reform Activities Af-
fecting Client Interests), are very narrow, dealing almost entirely with
the role of private lawyers as officers or directors of legal services and
law reform organizations, rather than in their capacity as advocates
for clients of these organizations.' Because Rule 6.4 addresses the
question of positional conflicts, though not in the advocacy context, it
does provide some indirect guidance. The rule states that "[a] lawyer
may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization involved
in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the re-
form may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer."6 When the law
reform activity undertaken by the organization with which the lawyer
is associated would benefit that lawyer's client, the rule requires dis-
closure of that fact, to prevent the lawyer from using the organization
to advance individual client interests.7 Rule 6.4 makes no mention of
a situation in which the law-reform activity would be detrimental to
the interests of a client of a lawyer-director, an implicit acceptance of
the fact that lawyers may ethically support two conflicting positions.
The Model Rules' discussion of law-reform activities lacks the positive
exhortation included in its predecessor, the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (the "Code").' The Code suggested that lawyers
should seek reform "without regard to the general interests or desires
of clients or former clients." 9
Only the comment to Model Rule 1.7, the general rule governing
conflicts of interest in simultaneous representations, specifically ad-
dresses the issue of positional conflicts. Paragraph nine of the com-
ment states: "A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic
positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless
representation of either client would be adversely affected."'" Having
articulated that positional conflicts are generally permissible, the com-
ment goes on to describe only one very narrow example of a situation
in which the impact of advocating two antagonistic positions may cre-
ate an impermissible conflict. It states that "it is ordinarily not im-
proper to assert such positions in cases pending in different trial
5. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 6.3, 6.4 (1998).
6. Id. Rule 6.4.
7. See id
8. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 8-1 (1981).
9. Id
10. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 cmt. (1998).
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courts, but it may be improper to do so in cases pending at the same
time in an appellate court."'" Under the approach of the Model
Rules, therefore, it would seem that in virtually all instances (except
for those few situations analogous to the head-to-head advocacy of
conflicting, precedent-setting positions in a single appellate court) ar-
guing opposing positions does not create conflicts or ethical concerns.
In situations involving a subsequent representation, the Model Rules
take the position that mere positional conflicts are almost never inap-
propriate or unethical. The comment to Model Rule 1.9, which deals
with conflicts of interest involving former clients, notes that "a lawyer
who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not
precluded from later representing another client in a wholly distinct
problem of that type even though the subsequent representation in-
volves a position adverse to the prior client."'"
Moving beyond the Model Rules, there are several ethics opinions,
including an ABA formal ethics opinion and several state opinions,
that address the question of positional conflicts in somewhat greater
depth.' 3 ABA Formal Opinion 93-377, for example, contains a some-
what more expansive and analytical treatment of when positional con-
flicts may become inappropriate absent disclosure and client
consent.' 4 The opinion outlines a two-pronged test for identifying
problematic positional conflicts when a lawyer is asked to advocate a
position with respect to a substantive legal issue that is directly con-
trary to the position being urged by the lawyer (or the lawyer's firm)
on behalf of another client in a different pending matter. The first
aspect is whether the two cases are being litigated in the same jurisdic-
tion (expanding the Model Rules' single appellate court test' 5 to in-
clude trial courts). 6 The second factor is whether "there is a
substantial risk that the lawyer's advocacy on behalf of one client will
create a legal precedent which is likely to materially undercut the legal
position being urged on behalf of the other client." 7 If both of these
factors are present, the lawyer should not take on the second client
without full disclosure and consent. Even if the two matters will not
be litigated in the same jurisdiction, the lawyer or firm must still deter-
mine, as a threshold question, whether the effectiveness of either cli-
ent will be materially limited by the lawyer's representation of the
11. Id.
12. Id. Rule 1.9 cmt.
13. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-
377 (1993); District of Columbia Bar, Op. 265 (1996); Standing Comm. on Prof'l Re-
sponsibility and Conduct, California State Bar, Formal Op. 1989-108 (1989).
14. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-
377 (1993).
15. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.





other. The formal opinion cites several factors that may help in mak-
ing this determination: (1) whether the issue is of such importance
that its determination is likely to affect the outcome of at least one of
the cases; (2) whether a determination of the issue in one case is likely
to have a significant impact on its determination in the other; and (3)
whether the lawyer, in representing both clients may be inclined to
soft-pedal or alter certain arguments to avoid impacting the other
case. Although the opinion certainly offers more specific guidance
than the Model Rules, the factors outlined in the opinion call for spec-
ulation and do not offer concrete suggestions concerning attorney
conduct.
Two state ethics opinions illustrate the range of approaches taken to
date regarding the positional conflicts issue. California Ethics Opin-
ion 1989-108 (based not on the Model Rules but on that state's rules
of professional conduct) finds that even under a worst-case scenario,
positional conflicts do not constitute an impermissible conflict of in-
terest.18 In the scenario presented in the opinion-a situation in
which the legal issue involved in two unrelated cases was identical and
both cases were pending in federal court and had been assigned to the
same judge-the opinion found that the conflict of interest rules
should be limited to traditional identity of party situations. The opin-
ion found that "if the attorney chooses not to disclose the two repre-
sentations [in a positional conflict situation] the attorney does not
violate his or her duty of loyalty to the client."' 9 It further suggested,
however, that while disclosure is not required, "the prudent attorney
would be well-advised to disclose 'issues conflicts' where the attorney
has reason to believe clients might be harmed by the continued undis-
closed dual representation."'- In a candid aside, the opinion noted
that "[t]his Committee is unable to provide a definitive test as to when
disclosure should be made."''
In contrast to the California opinion, under which a positional con-
flict would virtually never rise to a violation of the ethics rules, Dis-
trict of Columbia Ethics Opinion 265 took a far more stringent
approach to positional conflicts than the Model Rules or the ABA
Formal Opinion.' The D.C. opinion concluded:
When a lawyer is asked to represent an entity that takes positions
on matters of law in a subject area in which the lawyer practices
regularly on behalf of other clients, the lawyer may not, without the
informed consent of all affected parties, accept simultaneous repre-
sentation of both clients where such representation creates a sub-
18. Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct, California State Bar,




22. See District of Columbia Bar, Op. 265 (1996).
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stantial risk that representation of one client will adversely affect
the representation of the other.23
In providing this guidance, the opinion relied on District of Columbia
Rule 1.7, a stricter version of the Model Rules statement on conflicts
of interest.24 The opinion did suggest, however, that the problem of
positional conflicts may be attenuated, in the instance of representa-
tion by a firm, if more than one lawyer in the firm is involved.25
Despite some divergence of approach between the Model Rules
and the ethics opinions cited, the authorities reviewed above are in
clear agreement on several propositions. First, positional conflicts are
simply not a factor except in simultaneous representation situations.
Second, there must be a strong likelihood of harm to one client.
Third, there is no bright line that identifies impermissible positional
conflicts; rather, lawyers are told, in effect, that they will know it when
they see it.
Although the literature on positional conflicts is limited, there are
several commentators who have added important insights on this
topic. According to John Dzienkowski, in an effort to provide more
concrete guidance to practitioners, Professors Hazard and Hodes have
identified four factors that can influence the severity of a positional
conflict.26 These factors are: (1) a central position in one case that the
client in the other matter feels strongly about;27 (2) when one client
litigates the issue frequently (the so-called repeat player situation) and
thus has a long-term interest in how the issue is decided;28 (3) the
existence of special knowledge or confidential information;29 and (4)
whether the matter involves a pure issue of law or whether factual
arguments can affect the outcome.3 ° These factors certainly offer a
more easily applied analysis of the countervailing interests that a posi-
23. Id.
24. See id. The Committee believed that the same result would be reached under
ABA Model Rule 1.7-a dubious proposition. See id. Compare District of Columbia
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 (1996) (setting forth a relatively restrictive
conflicts rule), with Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 (1998) (setting
forth a more permissive conflicts rule).
25. See id.
26. See John S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 457,
479 (1993).
27. See id. (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, 1 The Law of
Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 1.7:105 (2d
ed. 1990)).
28. See id. (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, 1 The Law of
Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 1.7:106 (2d
ed. 1990)).
29. See id. (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, 1 The Law of
Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 1.7:105 (2d
ed. 1990)).
30. See id. (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, 1 The Law of




tional conflict situation may affect. Unlike Hazard and Hodes, how-
ever, who contend that a fact-based matter is more likely to pose an
impermissible conflict (factor 4), I agree with Dzienkowski who as-
serts that cases involving mixed questions of fact and law are less
likely to create a problem than pure issues of law.31
Dzienkowski, in his seminal article on positional conflicts, made an-
other important contribution to the practical analysis and identifica-
tion of issues conflicts.32 He noted that potential conflicts can arise
not only in the context of litigation, but also in transactional work and
in the lobbying arena.33
III. POSITIONAL CONFLICTS: WHAT Is AT STAKE
Positional conflicts, if broadly defined, can have a deleterious effect
on the availability of precisely the type of pro bono assistance that is
in critically short supply. Therefore, it is essential to analyze what val-
ues and interests are at stake in constructing a workable approach to
positional conflicts.
The strongest arguments in favor of determining that positional
conflicts, under certain circumstances, are impermissible in the ab-
sence of full disclosure and client consent are the two obligations to-
ward clients that are at the foundation of all conflicts concerns: the
duty of loyalty and the duty of confidentiality. In a positional conflict
situation, where the problem may arise because of identity of issue
rather than identity of client, maintaining client confidentiality is far
less of a concern. While there may be circumstances in which the law-
yer's familiarity with the client's practices may come into play,3 in
most cases involving positional conflicts it is unlikely that detailed
confidential information will either help or hurt the lawyer in effec-
tively asserting a contrary position.
The duty of loyalty continues to be a factor in positional conflict
situations, although it is less of a factor than in traditional conflicts of
interest. No client can reasonably expect that the client's lawyer will
always refrain from arguing, in an unrelated case or in negotiating a
contract in an unrelated matter, a position that is at odds with that
advocated by the lawyer on behalf of the client. Two of the factors
alluded to by Hazard and Hodes-the centrality of the issue for the
client and the likelihood that the position is one that the client will
need to advance repeatedly 3 -along with an examination of the prec-
edential value of the attorney's advocacy, can identify the relatively
unusual situation in which the client is so closely identified with a par-
31. See Dzienkowski, supra note 26, at 479 n.104.
32. See id. at 457-540.
33. See id. at 483-84.
34. See note 29 and accompanying text.
35. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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ticular position that the lawyer's advocacy of a contrary position in an
unrelated matter would create ethical problems.
Beyond the lawyer's obligations to clients, broader policy and socie-
tal issues may support the determination that a particular positional
conflict is impermissible. Concerns about loss of credibility may arise,
for example, if the lawyer advocates contrary positions before the
same judge or in the same forum. The danger of creating conflicting
precedents, where the position argued is at the heart of the matters, is
another societal concern, although it could also be argued that our
system of justice constantly faces conflicting determinations and re-
solves the issue through the appellate courts. Some commentators
have cited a fear that the lawyer will soft pedal the issue in one of the
matters involved. Such a concern, as well as identification of which
matter or client will be impacted, is, however, a highly speculative
problem that is outweighed by the practical and policy concerns that
mitigate in favor of finding the positional conflict permissible.
In general, neither the interests of individual clients (except in cer-
tain limited situations) nor broader policy concerns can justify a broad
application of conflicts of interest principles to the positional conflict
situation. In contrast, the policy arguments against an overly broad
definition of positional conflicts are very strong. Our legal system is
premised on the concept that independent lawyers can and will effec-
tively advocate a wide range of legal positions, including competing
positions on behalf of different clients; indeed, lawyers do so rou-
tinely. A broad definition of impermissible positional conflicts would
not only substantially alter that basic premise, but would also limit the
ability of clients to secure the lawyers of their choice. It would further
impose tremendous burdens and would be difficult to implement, be-
cause identification of such potential conflicts is extremely difficult.
How, at the beginning of an engagement, can a lawyer be expected to
identify and analyze every possible legal argument that he or she may
present? Further, it is essential that lawyers participate in public in-
terest, particularly law reform, activities. Finally, in the context of po-
sitional conflicts involving legal positions rather than directly
opposing parties, the concerns about the duties of loyalty and confi-
dentiality are far more attenuated. As a result, in the law firm con-
text, there is far less justification for imputed disqualification in
positional conflicts situations.
IV. PRACTICAL REALITIES: How ARE FIRvrs TREATING
POSITIONAL CONFLICTS IN THE PRO BONO CONTEXT?
Existing rules and opinions generally view most positional conflict
situations as ethically permissible, but provide little practical guidance
in identifying and processing such situations. In dealing with posi-
tional conflicts in practice, major law firms typically ignore the few
rules and opinions in existence and handle potential positional con-
2288 [Vol. 67
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flicts on an ad hoc basis that rarely includes a broader analysis of the
legal and ethical issues, the potential difficulties that may arise, and
the interests that must be weighed and balanced in determining
whether representation is ethical.
A recent law review article by Norman Spaulding does an excellent
job of surveying and summarizing current law firm practice concern-
ing the acceptance or rejection of a pro bono matter that may raise a
positional conflict.3 6 Spaulding's conclusions concerning the current
practices among law firms are entirely consistent with my observations
of firm policies and practices, derived from years of providing techni-
cal assistance on pro bono matters to major law firms through the Law
Firm Pro Bono Project.37 Typically, most major law firms' handling of
potential positional conflicts in the pro bono context has the following
characteristics:
1. Absence of Formal Policy or Procedure: Although most major
law firms have clearly defined written policies and practices regarding
traditional conflicts, virtually none maintain a written policy and for-
mal procedure to assist them in identifying potential positional con-
flicts and in determining the appropriate resolution if such a conflict
arises. As a result, firms identify and handle positional conflicts on a
case-by-case basis without any clear guidelines and with little or no
relation to prior actions taken.
2. Decisions Made Without Consulting Relevant Legal Authority:
In most firms, determinations concerning positional conflicts are made
without any reference to existing ethical rules, opinions, or
commentary.
3. Overly Broad Definitions of Impermissible Positional Conflicts:
As a result of the lack of legal guidance or analysis, firms often over-
broadly define positional conflicts in a manner that requires them to
turn down proposed pro bono engagements. Some firms simply ex-
clude any pro bono involvement in a broadly defined category of cases
and matters under the rubric of positional conflicts. For example,
some law firms insist that, to avoid positional conflicts, they must re-
fuse any pro bono matters that involve representation of an employee
or any environmental matter in which the firm would represent con-
sumers. Other firms may turn down a pro bono assignment when
there is no possibility of positional conflict with a current client be-
cause of an inchoate, potential conflict that may arise in the future.
One firm, for example, turned down a pro bono environmental case
36. See Spaulding, supra note 1, at 1409-20.
37. The Law Firm Pro Bono Project is a program sponsored by the Pro Bono
Institute in cooperation with the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Pro Bono and Public Interest. The Project, established in 1989, provides information,
advice, technical assistance, and materials to larger law firms (i.e.. the 700 law firms
with more than 50 attorneys) to enable those firms to improve and expand their pro
bono efforts and to integrate that pro bono work into the overall culture of the firm.
For more information, view the Project's web site at <http'/vww.probonoinst.org>.
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because, though it currently handled no environmental matters, it had
hopes of building an environmental practice in the future. Such deter-
minations are clearly not warranted under any interpretation, even
the most stringent, of the current law.
4. Failure to Use the Option of Disclosure and Client Consent:
Even if firms narrowly and correctly identify those limited situations
in which an impermissible positional conflict may arise, they typically
use only one approach to deal with that conflict-refusing the pro
bono engagement. The Model Rules and the commentary, however,
clearly indicate that a firm has another alternative-disclosing the
possibility of a positional conflict and seeking consent of both clients
involved. In part because of the overly broad definition of positional
conflict used by most firms, and in part because of their concern over
upsetting their paying clients, there is virtually no use of the estab-
lished process of disclosure and consent to resolve potential positional
conflicts. As a result, law firms may well overestimate the concerns of
corporate clients, thereby heightening the imbalance of power be-
tween pro bono concerns and paying matters.
For many reasons, pro bono engagements receive less favorable
treatment from law firms. The fact that paying clients are more likely
to be long-term clients of the firm, while many pro bono requests are
episodic, works against the pro bono client. The current economic cli-
mate in which major law firms now operate-a highly competitive en-
vironment in which large corporate clients have a greater voice in all
aspects of law firm practice, and in which firms are reluctant to risk
alienating existing or potential clients in any way-places pro bono
clients at an even greater disadvantage. These innate problems are,
however, greatly and unnecessarily exacerbated by current law firm
practices with respect to positional conflicts: practices that handle po-
sitional conflicts on an ad hoc basis, ignore existing legal standards,
and underutilize a solution-disclosure and client consent-that could
maximize pro bono resources.
V. ADDRESSING THE HYPOTHETICALS
After reviewing the literature and the competing interests that must
go into any analysis of positional conflicts, addressing the hypothetical
situations outlined earlier in this Article can provide a clearer
roadmap of how positional conflicts may arise and how best to deal
with them.
Hypothetical 1 (Retroactive Application of a Civil Rights Law):
Using the factors outlined above, this hypothetical presents a prob-
lematic positional conflict situation. The position involved in the pro-
spective litigation is precisely the opposite of the position the firm
advanced on behalf of current clients, albeit in a different forum. If
the firm were to take on the pro bono litigation, the interests of its
other clients, as evidenced by their focus on this issue in the legislative
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context, would be seriously affected. In addition, the firm's corporate
client is likely to address this issue repeatedly until it is conclusively
resolved. Under the facts as outlined, the firm should probably not
accept the pro bono case. Although the firm has the option of seeking
consent from both parties, this is probably not a realistic option given
the centrality of the issue for both parties. If the corporate client for
whom the firm lobbied was no longer a client, however, there would
be no impermissible positional conflict because such conflicts are vir-
tually unknown in the subsequent representation context. In addition,
there would be no positional conflict if the corporate client had not
engaged the firm previously to lobby against retroactive application of
this law. Although it could be argued that all corporate employers
might be harmed by retroactive application, such harm is too specula-
tive and remote to warrant turning down an important pro bono
matter.
Hypothetical 2 (Representing an Individual Title VII Litigant):
This hypothetical poses no ethical problem for the firm and represents
an overly broad and unwarranted definition of positional conflicts. In-
dividual employment discrimination cases under Title VII are typi-
cally fact-based applications of existing law that would not be
materially adverse to any position taken by a firm client. There is no
ethical constraint that would prohibit a law firm from taking on this
matter.
Hypothetical 3 (Floodlands Environmental Law Suit): As in the
previous hypothetical, there is no positional conflict evidenced here.
The firm does not, and has never, represented a client in advocating a
position directly contrary to one that the firm would advocate in the
Maine dam case. Some might argue that the firm has a legitimate
interest in protecting its future availability and attractiveness to corpo-
rate clients who may want the firm to oppose wetlands protections.
Applicable legal authority, however, clearly states that a firm would
not be barred on ethical grounds from accepting the pro bono matter
if it had conducted such advocacy in the past on behalf of a former
client. It is wholly baseless and speculative, therefore, to contend that
the firm should turn down this matter because of an inchoate concern
about potential future clients.
Hypothetical 4 (Negotiating a Contract): In this transactional hypo-
thetical, the firm is taking a position that is adverse to one taken on
behalf of another client. An examination of the other factors involved
in this matter, however, demonstrates that no impermissible conflict
exists. First, this is a transactional matter. As Dzienkowski pointed
out, representation in this context is less likely to give rise to an im-
permissible conflict.38 Work in a private context, unlike litigation, is
less likely to create clashing precedents. It is also not clear that the
38. See Dzienkowski, supra note 26, at 502-07.
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"tie-in" issue is the most central matter in these contract negotiations.
In addition, the contrary position in this matter was advanced by other
attorneys in the firm, in a different city, and in a negotiation involving
a different industry. In light of all of these factors, it is reasonable to
conclude that no impermissible positional conflict exists.
Hypothetical 5 (Lobbying in Connection with Government Con-
tracts): This hypothetical represents a closer case than any of the hy-
potheticals detailed above. The positions to be taken are, at first
glance, directly contradictory to each other. Both the pro bono and
the paying representation would take place in the same forum: Con-
gress. Both involve lobbying, a uniquely personal type of advocacy
that may implicate credibility issues more clearly than litigation or
transactional work. On the other hand, the issue of penalties for pri-
vate companies in the welfare context can, quite easily, be distin-
guished from military procurement, a highly specialized area. The
consumers in the welfare context have no clout and no options if the
companies are not responsive and accurate. The private companies
are making their first foray into this area. Welfare reform legislation,
as a matter of public policy, seeks to protect the poor from punitive
and unlawful deprivation of funds and resources. While a prudent (or
nervous) law firm may want to disclose a potential positional conflict
to both parties and seek consent (which might well be freely given by
the military contractors), this particular situation probably does not
present a troubling positional conflict.
VI. DEVELOPING A MORE THOUGHTFUL, PRACTICAL, AND
BALANCED APPROACH TO POSITIONAL CONFLICTS:
SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
Both the current ethical analysis and the practical treatment of po-
tential positional conflicts warrant improvement. The following rec-
ommendations would result in a more reasoned and reasonable
approach to this important issue.
A. Amending the Model Rules
The current definition of positional conflicts in the Model Rules is
too restrictive, and the issue as a whole is not dealt with thoroughly.
The commentary to Rule 1.7 should be revised to include a definition
(or example) of positional conflicts that is, at least, consistent with
ABA Formal Opinion 93-377.39 Ideally, that comment would include
a more comprehensive analysis of the competing interests and de-
mands that must be balanced in determining whether an impermissi-
ble conflict exists in positional advocacy-one that incorporates the
factors alluded to by Hazard and Hodes, Dzienkowski,4 ° and others.
39. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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Rule 1.7 should also cross-reference Rule 6.4.4" Surely, the standard
for finding a positional conflict should be higher in a situation in
which access to the system, not merely client choice, is at stake. In
addition, Rule 6.4 should be amended to incorporate the Code's ex-
hortation to undertake law reform work.42
B. Making Law Firm Determinations Fairer and More Accurate
1. Law firms should establish formal, written policies that define
positional conflicts of interest in a balanced manner that is consistent
with current ethical guidelines. These policies should be broadly dis-
seminated within the law firm and should be used to determine
whether impermissible positional conflicts exist for pro bono and pay-
ing clients alike. The policies should identify the pivotal role of law
firms in law reform work as an important factor in assessing and deal-
ing with positional conflicts.
2. In addition, since the lack of clear firm policies has resulted in
some-perhaps widespread-misunderstanding of positional conflicts,
the firm should educate its lawyers on the new policy and appropriate
parameters.
3. Law firms should establish clear procedures-making the same
procedures applicable to both paying and pro bono clients-for deal-
ing with potential positional conflicts. These procedures should en-
sure that any decision about a potential conflict should be determined
on a firm-wide basis, rather than giving one department or practice
group the final say on the existence of a conflict.
4. Law firms should identify those areas of pro bono practice that
may pose problems, in the context of positional conflicts, in light of
the firm's practice and current clients. The firm can then meet with
commercial clients to explore their concerns and to identify areas of
pro bono practice that would not pose a problem to those clients.
Corporations and corporate legal departments are increasingly aware
of the problems that result when one segment of society is denied ac-
cess to the legal system, and they may be willing to support a balanced
approach. The firm should also meet with legal advocacy groups to
narrowly identify sensitive and inappropriate areas for pro bono refer-
rals, as well as to identify those matters in which the firm would wel-
come referrals.
5. In those instances where firm policy and analysis uncover a true
positional conflict problem, the firm should explore the feasibility of
seeking consent to represent both parties, rather than automatically
declining the pro bono matter.
6. To ensure that advocacy, including law reform work, is available
to those who are unable to secure counsel for financial and other rea-
41. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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sons, law firms, legal advocacy groups, and legal services providers
should consult to assess the overall availability of assistance for law
reform work in their city, state, or, in some instances, in the nation, for
particular areas of the law. Working together, the firms and groups
can develop a comprehensive plan that ensures that, despite any con-
straints faced by particular firms, sufficient resources are available to
ensure that the poor and disadvantaged in the community have access
to broad remedies and policy advocacy.
CONCLUSION
Current ethical standards and writings offer far too little guidance
to enable lawyers to comfortably address the complexities of posi-
tional conflicts. Current law firm practice, on the other hand, too
often consists of an unexamined and ad hoc approach to such conflicts
that turns more on anxiety about client reactions than on a careful
examination of legal, ethical, and policy considerations that admit
market realities but tempers those concerns with an affirmative com-
mitment to access to justice. This Article offers both practical gui-
dance and legal analysis that could, if adopted, result in a balanced
approach that will expand law firm participation in the major policy
issues of our time without exposing the firms to ethical violations or
client defections.
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